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Abstract
Despite improved control measures, Ebola remains a serious public health risk in
African regions where recurrent outbreaks have been observed since the initial epidemic
in 1976. Using epidemic modeling and data from two well-documented Ebola outbreaks
(Congo 1995 and Uganda 2000), we estimate the number of secondary cases generated
by an index case in the absence of control interventions (R0). Our estimate of R0 is 1.83
(SD 0.06) for Congo (1995) and 1.34 (SD 0.03) for Uganda (2000). We model the course
of the outbreaks via an SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed) epidemic model
that includes a smooth transition in the transmission rate after control interventions are
put in place. We perform an uncertainty analysis of the basic reproductive number R0 to
quantify its sensitivity to other disease-related parameters. We also analyze the sensitivity
of the final epidemic size to the time interventions begin and provide a distribution for
the final epidemic size. The control measures implemented during these two outbreaks
(including education and contact tracing followed by quarantine) reduce the final epidemic
size by a factor of 2 relative the final size with a two-week delay in their implementation.
1 Introduction
Ebola hemorrhagic fever is a highly infectious and lethal disease named after a river in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) where it was first identified in 1976 [1].
Twelve outbreaks of Ebola have been reported in Congo, Sudan, Gabon, and Uganda as of
September 14, 2003 [2, 3]. Two different strains of the Ebola virus (Ebola-Zaire and the Ebola-
Sudan) have been reported in those regions. Despite extensive search, the reservoir of the Ebola
virus has not yet been identified [4, 5]. Ebola is transmitted by physical contact with body
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fluids, secretions, tissues or semen from infected persons [1, 6]. Nosocomial transmission (trans-
mission from patients within hospital settings) has been typical as patients are often treated
by unprepared hospital personnel (barrier nursing techniques need to be observed). Individuals
exposed to the virus who become infectious do so after a mean incubation period of 6.3 days
(1 − 21 days) [7]. Ebola is characterized by initial flu-like symptoms which rapidly progress
to vomiting, diarrhea, rash, and internal and external bleeding. Infected individuals receive
limited care as no specific treatment or vaccine exists. Most infected persons die within 10 days
of their initial infection [8] (50%− 90% mortality [6]).
Using a simple SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed) epidemic model (Figure 1) and
data from two well-documented Ebola outbreaks (Congo 1995 and Uganda 2000), we estimate
the number of secondary cases generated by an index case in the absence of control interventions
(R0). Our estimates of R0 are 1.83 (SD 0.06) for Congo (1995) and 1.34 (SD 0.03) for Uganda
(2000). We model the course of the outbreaks via an SEIR epidemic model that includes a
smooth transition in the transmission rate after control interventions are put in place. We
also perform an uncertainty analysis on the basic reproductive number R0 to account for its
sensitivity to disease-related parameters and analyze the model sensitivity of the final epidemic
size to the time at which interventions begin. We provide a distribution for the final epidemic
size. A two-week delay in implementing public health measures results in an approximated
doubling of the final epidemic size.
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2 Methods
We fit data from Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreaks in Congo (1995) and Uganda (2000) to
a simple deterministic (continuous time) SEIR epidemic model (Figure 1). The least-squares
fit of the model provides estimates for the epidemic parameters. The fitted model can then
be used to estimate the basic reproductive number R0 and quantify the impact of intervention
measures on the transmission rate of the disease. Interpreting the fitted model as an expected
value of a Markov process, we use multiple stochastic realizations of the epidemic to estimate
a distribution for the final epidemic size. We also study the sensitivity of the final epidemic
size to the timing of interventions and perform an uncertainty analysis on R0 to account for
the high variability in disease-related parameters in our model.
2.1 Epidemic Models
Individuals are assumed to be in one of the following epidemiological states (Figure 1): suscep-
tibles (at risk of contracting the disease), exposed (infected but not yet infectious), infectives
(capable of transmitting the disease), and removed (those who recover or die from the disease).
2.1.1 Differential Equation Model
Susceptible individuals in class S in contact with the virus enter the exposed class E at the
per-capita rate βI/N , where β is transmission rate per person per day, N is the total effective
population size, and I/N is the probability that a contact is made with a infectious individual
(i.e. uniform mixing is assumed). Exposed individuals undergo an average incubation period
(assumed asymptomatic and uninfectious) of 1/k days before progressing to the infectious class
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I. Infectious individuals move to the R-class (death or recovered) at the per-capita rate γ (see
Figure 1). The above transmission process is modeled by the following system of nonlinear
ordinary differential equations [9, 10]:
S˙(t) = −βS(t)I(t)/N
E˙(t) = βS(t)I(t)/N − kE(t)
I˙(t) = kE(t)− γI(t)
R˙(t) = γI(t)
C˙(t) = kE(t),
(1)
where S(t), E(t), I(t), and R(t) denote the number of susceptible, exposed, infectious, and
removed individuals at time t (the dot denotes time derivatives). C(t) is not an epidemiological
state but serves to keep track of the cumulative number of Ebola cases from the time of onset
of symptoms.
2.1.2 Markov Chain Model
The analogous stochastic model (continuous time Markov chain) is constructed by considering
three events: exposure, infection and removal. The transition rates are defined as:
5
Event Effect Transition rate
Exposure (S, E, I, R) → (S-1, E+1, I, R) β(t)SI/N
Infection (S, E, I, R) → (S, E-1, I+1, R) kE
Removal (S, E, I, R) → (S, E, I-1, R+1) γI
The event times 0 < T1 < T2 < ... at which an individual moves from one state to another are
modeled as a renewal process with increments distributed exponentially,
P (Tk − Tk−1 > t|Tj, j ≤ k − 1) = e
−tµ(Tk−1)
where µ(Tk−1) = (β(Tk−1)S(Tk−1)I(Tk−1)/N + kE(Tk−1) + γI(Tk−1))
−1.
The final epidemic size is Z = C(T ) where T = min{t > 0, E(t) + I(t) = 0}, and its empirical
distribution can be computed via Monte Carlo simulations [11].
2.2 The Transmission Rate and the Impact of Interventions
The intervention strategies to control the spread of Ebola include surveillance, placement of
suspected cases in quarantine for three weeks (the maximum estimated length of the incubation
period), education of hospital personnel and community members on the use of strict barrier
nursing techniques (i.e protective clothing and equipment, patient management), and the rapid
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burial or cremation of patients who die from the disease [6]. Their net effect, in our model, is to
reduce the transmission rate β from β0 to β1 < β0. In practice, the impact of the intervention
is not instantaneous. Between the time of the onset of the intervention to the time of full
compliance, the transmission rate is assumed to decrease gradually from β0 to β1 according to
β(t) =


β0 t < τ
β1 + (β0 − β1)e
−q(t−τ) t ≥ τ
where τ is the time at which interventions start and q controls the rate of the transition from
β0 to β1. Another interpretation of the parameter q can be given in terms of th =
ln(2)
q
, the
time to achieve β(t) = β0+β1
2
.
2.3 Epidemiological data
The data for the Congo (1995) and Uganda (2000) Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreaks include
the identification dates of the causative agent and data sources. The reported data are (ti, yi),
i = 1, ..., n where ti denotes the i
th reporting time and yi the cumulative number of infectious
cases from the beginning of the outbreak to time ti.
Congo 1995. This outbreak began in the Bandundu region, primarily in Kikwit, located on
the banks of the Kwilu River. The first case (January 6) involved a 42-year old male charcoal
worker and farmer who died on January 13. The Ebola virus was not identified as the causative
agent until May 9. At that time, an international team implemented a control plan that in-
volved active surveillance (identification of cases) and education programs for infected people
and their family members. Family members were visited for up to three weeks (maximum incu-
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bation period) after their last identified contact with a probable case. Nosocomial transmission
occurred in Kikwit General Hospital but it was halted through the institution of strict barrier
nursing techniques that included the use of protective equipment and special isolation wards.
A total of 315 cases of Ebola were identified (81% case fatality). Daily Ebola cases by date of
symptom onset from March 1 through July 12 are available (Figure 2) [12].
Uganda 2000. A total of 425 cases (53% case fatality) of Ebola were identified in three dis-
tricts of Uganda: Gulu, Masindi and Mbara. The onset of symptoms for the first reported case
was on August 30, but the cause was not identified as Ebola until October 15 by the National
Institute of Virology in Johannesburg (South Africa). Active surveillance started during the
third week of October. A plan that included the voluntary hospitalization of probable cases
was then put in place. Suspected cases were closely followed for up to three weeks. Other con-
trol measures included community education (avoiding crowd gatherings during burials) and
the systematic implementation of protective measures by health care personnel and the use of
special isolation wards in hospitals. Weekly Ebola cases by date of symptom onset are available
from the WHO (World Health Organization) [13] (from August 20, 2000 through January 7,
2001) (Figure 2).
2.4 Parameter Estimation
Empirical studies in Congo suggest that the incubation period is less than 21 days with a mean
of 6.3 days [7] and the infectious period is between 3.5 and 10.7 days. The model parameters
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Θ = (β0, β1, k, q, γ) are fitted to the Congo (1995) and Uganda (2000) Ebola outbreak data by
least squares fit to the cumulative number of cases C(t,Θ) in eqn. (1). We used a computer pro-
gram (Berkeley Madonna, Berkeley, CA) and appropriate initial conditions for the parameters
(0 < β < 1, 0 < q < 100, 1 < 1/k < 21 [7], 3.5 < 1/γ < 10.7 [14]). The optimization process
was repeated 10 times (each time the program is fed with two different initial conditions for
each parameter) before the “best fit” was chosen. The asymptotic variance-covariance AV (θˆ)
of the least-squares estimate is
AV (θˆ) = σ2(
n∑
i=1
∇C(ti,Θ0)∇C(ti,Θ0)
T )−1
which we estimate by
σˆ2(
n∑
i=1
∇ˆC(ti, Θˆ)∇ˆC(ti, Θˆ)
T )−1
where n is the total number of observations, σˆ2 = 1
n−5
∑
(yi−C(ti, Θˆ))
2 and ∇ˆC are numerical
derivatives of C.
For small samples, the confidence intervals based on these variance estimates may not have
the nominal coverage probability. For example, for the case of Zaire 1995, the 95% confidence
interval for q based on asymptomatic normality is (−0.26, 2.22). It should be obvious that this
interval is not “sharp” as it covers negative values whereas we know q ≥ 0. The likelihood ratio
provides an attractive alternative to build confidence sets (Figure 3). Formally, these sets are
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of the form
{
Θ :
∑
(yi − C(ti,Θ))
2∑
(yi − C(ti, Θˆ))2
≤ Aα
}
where Aα is the 1 − α quantile of an F distribution with appropriate degrees of freedom.
Parameter estimates are given in Table 1.
2.5 The Reproductive Number
The basic reproductive number R0 measures the average number of secondary cases generated
by a primary case in a pool of mostly susceptible individuals [9, 10] and is an estimate of the
epidemic growth at the start of an outbreak if everyone is susceptible. That is, a primary
case generates R0 =
β0
γ
new cases on the average where β0 is the pre-interventions transmis-
sion rate and 1/γ is the mean infectious period. The effective reproductive number at time t,
Reff (t) =
β(t)
γ
x(t), measures the average number of secondary cases per infectious case t time
units after the introduction of the initial infections and x(t) = S(t)
N
≈ 1 as the population size
is much larger than the resulting size of the outbreak (Table 2). Hence, Reff (0) = R0. In a
closed population, the effective reproductive number Reff (t) is non-increasing as the size of the
susceptible population decreases. The case Reff (t) ≤ 1 is of special interest as it highlights
the crossing of the threshold to eventual control of the outbreak. An intervention is judged
successful if it reduces the effective reproductive number to a value less than one. In our model,
the post-intevention reproductive number Rp =
β1
γ
where β1 denotes the post-intervention
transmission rate. In general, the smaller β1, the faster an outbreak is extinguished. By the
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delta method [15], the variance of the estimated basic reproductive number Rˆ0 is approximately
V (Rˆ0) ≈ Rˆ0
2
{
V (βˆ0)
βˆ0
2 +
V (γˆ)
γˆ2
−
2Cov(βˆ0, γˆ)
βˆ0γˆ
}.
2.6 The Effective Population Size
A rough estimate of the population size in the Bandundu region of Congo (where the epidemic
developed) in 1995 is computed from the population size of the Bandundu region in 1984 [16]
and annual population growth rates [17] (Table 2). For the case of Uganda (2000), we adjusted
the population sizes of the districts of Gulu, Masindi and Mbara in 1991 and annual population
growth rates [18] (Table 2). These estimates are an upper bound of the effective population size
(those at risk of becoming infected) for each region. Estimates of the effective population size
are essential when the incidence is modeled with the pseudo mass-action assumption (β(t)SI)
which implies that transmission grows linearly with the population size and hence the basic
reproductive number R0(N) = β0N/γ. In our model, we use the true mass-action assumption
(β(t)SI/N) which makes the model parameters (homogeneous system of order 1) independent
of N and hence the basic reproductive number can be estimated by R0 = β0/γ [19]. In
fact, comparisons between the pseudo mass-action and the true mass-action assumptions with
experimental data have concluded in favor of the later [20]. The model assumption that N is
constant is not critical as the outbreaks resulted in a small number of cases compared to the
size of the population.
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2.7 Uncertainty Analysis on R0
Log-normal distributions seem to model well the incubation period distributions for a large
number of diseases [21]. Here, a log-normal distribution is assumed for the incubation period of
Ebola in our uncertainty analysis. Log-normal distribution parameters are set from empirical
observations (mean incubation period is 6.3 and the 95% quantile is 21 days [7]). The infectious
period is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the range (3.5− 10.7) days [14].
A formula for the basic reproductive number R0 that depends on the initial per-capita rate
of growth r in the number of cases (Figure 4), the incubation period (1/k) and the infectious
period (1/γ) can be obtained by linearizing equations E˙ and I˙ of system (1) around the disease-
free equilibrium with S = N . The corresponding Jacobian matrix is given by:
J =

 −k β
k −γ

 ,
and the characteristic equation is given by:
r2 + (k + γ)r + (γ − β)k = 0
where the early-time and per-capita free growth r is essentially the dominant eigenvalue. By
solving for β in terms of r, k and γ, one can obtain the following expression for R0 using the
fact that R0 = β/γ:
R0 = 1 +
r2 + (k + γ)r
kγ
.
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Our estimate of the initial rate of growth r for the Congo 1995 epidemic is r = 0.07 day−1,
obtained from the time series y(t), t < τ of the cumulative number of cases and assuming
exponential growth (y(t) ∝ ert). The distribution of R0 (Figure 4) lies in the interquartile
range (IQR) (1.66 − 2.28) with a median of 1.89, generated from Monte Carlo sampling of
size 105 from the distributed epidemic parameters (1/k and 1/γ) for fixed r [22]. We give the
median of R0 (not the mean) as the resulting distribution of R0 from our uncertainty analysis
is skewed to the right.
3 Results
Using our parameter estimates (Table 1), we estimate an R0 of 1.83 (SD 0.06) for Congo (1995)
and 1.34 (SD 0.03) for Uganda (2000). The effectiveness of interventions is often quantified
in terms of the reproductive number Rp after interventions are put in place. For the case of
Congo Rp = 0.51 (SD 0.04) and Rp = 0.66 (SD 0.02) for Uganda allowing us to conclude that
in both cases, the intervention was successful in controlling the epidemic. Furthermore, the
time to achieve a transmission rate of β0+β1
2
(th) is 0.71 (95% CI (0.02, 1.39)) days and 0.11
(95% CI (0, 0.87)) days for the cases of Congo and Uganda respectively after the time at which
interventions begin.
We use the estimated parameters to simulate the Ebola outbreaks in Congo (1995) and Uganda
(2000) via Monte Carlo simulations of the stochastic model of Section 2.1 [11]. There is very
good agreement between the mean of the stochastic simulations and the reported cases despite
the “wiggle” captured in the residuals around the time τ of the start of interventions (Figure 5).
The empirical distribution of the final epidemic sizes for the cases of Congo 1995 and Uganda
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2000 are given in Figure 6.
The final epidemic size is sensitive to the start time of interventions τ . Numerical solutions
(deterministic model) show that the final epidemic size grows exponentially fast with the initial
time of interventions (not surprising as the intial epidemic growth is driven by exponential
dynamics). For instance, for the case of Congo, our model predicts that there would have been
20 more cases if interventions had started one day later (Figure 7).
4 Discussion
Using epidemic-curve data from two major Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreaks [12, 13], we have
estimated the basic reproductive number (R0) (Table 2). Our estimate of R0 (median is 1.89)
obtained from an uncertainty analysis [22] by simple random sampling (Figure 4) of the pa-
rameters k and γ distributed according to empirical data from the Zaire (now the Democratic
Republic of Congo) 1976 Ebola outbreak [7, 14] is in agreement with our estimate of R0 = 1.83
from the outbreak in Congo 1995 (obtained from least squares fitting of our model (1) to epi-
demic curve data).
The difference in the basic reproductive numbers R0 between Congo and Uganda is due to our
different estimates for the infectious period (1/γ) observed in these two places. Their transmis-
sion rates β0 are quite similar (Table 1). Our estimate for the infectious period for the case of
Congo (5.61 days) is slightly larger than that of Uganda (3.50 days). Clearly, a larger infectious
period increases the likelihood of infecting a susceptible individual and hence increases the basic
reproductive number. The difference in the infectious periods might be due to differences in
virus subtypes [23]. The Congo outbreak was caused by the Ebola-Zaire virus subtype [12]
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while the Uganda outbreak was caused by the Ebola-Sudan virus subtype [13].
The significant reduction from the basic reproductive number (R0) to the post-intervention re-
productive number (Rp) in our estimates for Congo and Uganda shows that the implementation
of control measures such as education, contact tracing and quarantine will have a significant
effect on lowering the effective reproductive rate of Ebola. Furthermore, estimates for the time
to achieve β0+β1
2
have been provided (Table 1).
We have explored the sensitivity of the final epidemic size to the starting time of interventions.
The exponential increase of the final epidemic size with the time of start of interventions (Figure
7) supports the idea that the rapid implementation of control measures should be considered
as a critical component in any contingency plan against disease outbreaks specially for those
like Ebola and SARS for which no specific treatment or vaccine exists. A two-week delay in
implementing public health measures results in an approximated doubling of the final outbreak
size. Because the existing control measures cut the transmission rate to less than half, we
should seek and support further improvement in the effectiveness of interventions for Ebola.
A mathematical model that considers basic public health interventions for SARS control in
Toronto supports this conclusion [24, 25]. Moreover, computer simulations show that small
perturbations to the rate q at which interventions are put fully in place do not have a signifi-
cant effect on the final epidemic size. The rapid identification of an outbreak, of course, remains
the strongest determinant of the final outbreak size.
Field studies of Ebola virus are difficult to conduct due to the high risk imposed on the sci-
entific and medical personnel [26]. Recently, a new vaccine that makes use of an adenovirus
technology has been shown to give cynomolgus macaques protection within 4 weeks of a single
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jab [27, 28]. If the vaccine turns out to be effective in humans, then its value should be tested.
A key question would be “What are the conditions for a successful target vaccination campaign
during an Ebola outbreak?” To address questions of this type elaborate models need to be
developed.
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Tables & Figures
Congo 1995 Uganda 2000
Parameter Definition Estim. S. D. Estim. S. D.
β0 Pre-interventions transmission rate (days
−1) 0.33 0.06 0.38 0.24
β1 Post-interventions transmission rate (days
−1) 0.09 0.01 0.19 0.13
th Time to achieve
β0+β1
2
(days) 0.71 (0.02, 1.39)† 0.11 (0, 0.87)†
1/k Mean incubation period (days) 5.30 0.23 3.35 0.49
1/γ Mean infectious period (days) 5.61 0.19 3.50 0.67
Table 1: Parameter definitions and baseline estimates obtained from the best fit of the model
equations (1) to the epidemic-curve data of the Congo 1995 and Uganda 2000 outbreaks (Figure
5). The parameters were optimized by a computer program (Berkeley Madonna, Berkeley, CA)
using a least squares fitting technique and appropriate initial conditions for the parameters
(0 < β < 1, 0 < q < 100, 1 < 1/k < 21 [7], 3.5 < 1/γ < 10.7 [14]). The optimization process
was repeated 10 times (each time the program is fed with two different initial conditions for
each parameter) before the “best fit” was chosen.
†95 % CI (Figure 3).
∗Adjusted from population size of the Bandundu region in 1984 [16] using the annual population growth
rates [17].
¶Adjusted from the population sizes of the districts of Gulu, Masindi and Mbara (where the outbreak
developed) in 1991 using the annual population growth rates [18].
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Outbreak Eff. Pop. Size (N) Start of interv. Fatality rate (%) Estim. R0 S.D. R0
Congo 1995 5, 364, 500∗ May 9, 1995 [12] 81% [12] 1.83 0.06
Uganda 2000 1, 867, 200 ¶ Oct 22, 2000 [13] 53% [13] 1.34 0.03
Table 2: Population parameters and estimated R0 for the Congo 1995 and the Uganda 2000
Ebola outbreaks. Notice that even though our expression for R0 is independent of N , our model
is not independent of N and hence the corresponding population sizes for Congo and Uganda
are used in the least-squares estimation of the parameters.
Figure 1: A schematic representation of the flow of individuals between epidemiological classes.
β I
N
is the transmission rate to susceptibles S from I; E is the class of infected (not yet infectious)
individuals; k is the rate at which E-individuals move to the symptomatic and infectious class
I; Infectious individuals (I) either die or recover at rate γ. C is not an epidemiological state
but keeps track of the cumulative number of cases after the time of onset of symptoms.
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Figure 2: On the left, we have the daily number of cases by date of symptom onset during the
Ebola outbreak in Congo 1995 (Mar 6-Jul 12). On the right, we have the weekly number of
cases by date of symptom onset during the Ebola outbreak in Uganda 2000 (Aug 20-Jan 07).
Data has been taken from refs. [12, 13].
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of β0+β1
2
, obtained from the likelihood ratio as described in the text.
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Figure 4: (Top) cumulative number of cases (log-lin scale) during the exponential growth phase
of the Congo 1995 epidemic as identified by the date of start of interventions (09 May 1995
[12]). The model-free initial growth rate of the number of cases for Congo 1995 is 0.07 (linear
regression); (bottom) estimated distribution of R0 from our uncertainty analysis (see text). R0
lies in the interquartile range (IQR) (1.66 − 2.28) with a median of 1.89. Notice that 100% of
the weight lies above R0 = 1.
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Figure 5: (Top) Comparison of the cumulative number of Ebola cases during the Congo 1995 and
Uganda 2000 Ebola outbreaks, as a function of the time of onset of symptoms. Circles are the
data. The solid line is the average of 250 Monte Carlo replicates and the error bars represent the
standard error around the mean from the simulation replicates using our parameter estimates
(Table 1). For the case of Congo 1995, simulations were begun on 13 Mar 1995. A reduction in
the transmission rate β due to the implementation of interventions occurs on 09 May 1995 (day
56) [12]. For the case of Uganda 2000, simulations start on 27 August 2000 and interventions
take place on 22 October 2000 (day 56) [13]; (bottom) comparison of the residuals (difference
between the data and the model best fit) scaled by the standard deviation for the cases of
Congo and Uganda.
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Figure 6: The final epidemic size distributions for the cases of Congo 1995 and Uganda 2000
obtained from 250 Monte Carlo replicas. Crosses (X) represent the final epidemic size from
data.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of the final epidemic size to the time of start of interventions. Here
negative numbers represent number of days before the actual reported intervention date (Table
2) and positive numbers represent a delay after the actual reported intervention date (τ = 0).
All other parameters have been fixed to their baseline values (Table 2). The final epidemic size
grows exponentially as expected with the time of interventions with a rate of 0.06 for the case
of Congo and 0.05 for the case of Uganda.
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